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Abstract
In many countries around the world, including Iran, obesity is 
reaching epidemic proportions. Doctors have recently taken, or 
expressed support for, an extreme ‘personal responsibility for health’ 
policy against obesity: refusing services to obese patients. This policy 
may initially seem to improve patients’ incentives to fight obesity. 
But turning access to medical services into a benefit dependent on 
health improvement is bad policy. It conditions the very aid that 
patients need in order to become healthier on success in becoming 
healthier. Whatever else we may think of personal responsibility 
for health policies, this particular one is absurd. Unfortunately, 
quite a few personal responsibility for health policies use similar 
absurd conditioning. They mistakenly use as ‘carrots’ or ‘sticks’ for 
adherence the basic means to the same health outcomes that they 
seek to promote. This perspective proposes the following rule of 
thumb: any conditional incentive for healthy choice should be in a 
currency other than the basic means to that healthy choice.
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The global obesity epidemic
High body mass index (BMI) is now a greater global risk factor 
for mortality and morbidity than childhood underweight (1). 
Worldwide, 44% of diabetes, 23% of ischaemic heart disease and 
7-41% of certain cancers are attributable to overweight (BMI 
between 25-29.9 kg/m2) and obesity (BMI≥30kg/m2). Once 
considered problems only in high income countries, overweight 
and obesity are now very common in low- and middle-income 
countries, particularly in urban settings. They also increase 
rapidly, with worldwide obesity having nearly doubled since 
1980 (2). Obesity costs health systems a lot. In the United States, 
in 2008, the medical costs for obese people were estimated at 
1,429 US dollars higher than for those  at normal weight and the 
overall medical costs associated with obesity were estimated at 
147 billion US dollars (3). 
In Iran, the prevalence of obesity has also reached epidemic 
proportions. In one study published in 2001, 40% and 23.1% 
of the adults in Tehran were found to be overweight and obese 
respectively (4). One meta-analysis put the overall prevalence 
of obesity among Iranian adults at 21.5% (5). In Iran, obesity 
specifically affects women and it varies considerably between 
age groups (5).
Doctors who reject obese patients
The armamentarium of policies on obesity treatment and 
prevention includes many that do not immediately engage 
patients, such as ensuring the availability of affordable fruits and 
vegetables, regulating sales of sugary drinks and of the content 
of prepackaged and restaurant food, and developing walkable 
cities, accessible public parks, and sports facilities. But some 
proposed policies engage patients more directly. For example, 
an increasing number of American workplaces have ‘wellness’ 
programs that give benefits like iPods or cash to employees who 
join gyms or simply lose weight. Recently, a senior bioethicist 
proposed an airline policy of calculating weight surcharges 
for luggage by summing up the weight of the luggage and 
that of the person holding the luggage—effectively making it 
more expensive for overweight people to fly, partly in order to 
‘discourage weight gain’ (6).
In several recent cases around the world, doctors or primary 
care trusts (PCTs) refused to admit new obese patients (7,8). 
In one incident in the American state I live in, a primary care 
physician (a general practitioner) claimed that it’s because her 
clinic lacks proper equipment, but she may have had additional 
motives. Earlier she had admitted that it is rather because she 
feels that if obese patients don’t lose weight, then ‘I’m paying 
the cost of other people’s choices.’ I assume that if she lacked 
the equipment for wheelchair-bound patients, she would go out 
and buy it. She may have had an ulterior motive to ramp up the 
“cost” of being obese—discouragement of weight gain (9,10).
A majority (54%) of doctors who responded in a survey 
published in the United Kingdom last year supported measures 
to deny treatment to the obese (as well as to smokers). Specifically, 
these doctors said that Britain’s National Health Service should 
have the right to withhold non-emergency treatment from 
patients who do not lose weight (7).
We must tackle the obesity problem head on. But conditioning 
medical access on weight loss is not the way.
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What is not the problem with rejecting obese patients
So-called personal responsibility for health policies are often 
resisted on wrong grounds. For example, a common criticism is 
that supportive environments and communities are fundamental 
in shaping people’s choices and in reducing obesity, smoking, 
and other risk factors that depend on personal choices and 
this somehow counts against personal responsibility policies. 
On this approach, the solution is social support rather than 
individual penalties. The food industry should be regulated, 
public parks and bike paths should be developed, and educators, 
doctors and other stakeholders should get behind the cause (11). 
Many writers who propose substituting incentives by ‘upstream’ 
health promotion measures make a similar point. The World 
Health Organization (WHO) may also make a related point 
when it warns, ‘Individual responsibility can only have its full 
effect where people have access to a healthy lifestyle, and are 
supported to make healthy choices’ (2).
I am not denying that social support is vital, or that other 
stakeholders have a major role to play as well. But that does 
not touch on the question whether policies that engage 
individual patients and their incentives directly make sense 
as well, alongside these social supports. On the face of it, the 
most promising approach would seem to be to use all the tools 
in our toolkit: to press social, legal, and educational levers as 
well as personal ones. And the latter do include the creation of 
evidence-based ‘carrots and sticks’ for health: material and other 
incentives and disincentives that make a healthier lifestyle more 
attractive than an unhealthy one, even in the short run.
Take the example of Iran. According to Iranian experts, ‘The 
increased consumption of calorie-dense regular and fast foods 
and sucrose-enriched drinks, together with an increasingly 
sedentary lifestyle, appear to be major factors contributing to 
the obesity epidemic’ (4). Among schoolchildren from Tehran, 
fast food consumption and mothers’ BMI are both associated 
with overweight and obesity (12). Does it even make sense 
to distinguish here between social support and individual 
(mothers’) choice? Social support would consist in institutional 
encouragement of healthy individual choices, such as the choices 
to diet and to feed one’s children fewer fast foods. Individuals 
would usually be likelier to make such healthy choices if those 
choices were made comparatively ‘cheaper’, by which I mean 
easier or otherwise less taxing than less-healthy choices. And 
there is no reason to rule out in advance policies that would 
make healthy choices comparatively cheaper, not only by 
providing social support that makes them ‘cost’ individuals 
less than they would otherwise, but also by providing relevant 
carrots that make them cost them lesson balance, or sticks that 
make them cheaper than less-healthy alternatives.
It is also said against personal responsibility policies that 
unhealthy choices to smoke, eat fast food, underutilize cost-
effective preventative services, and others, are disproportionally 
high among minorities and the economically worse off. 
Therefore, it is said, personal responsibility policies would 
disproportionately penalize minorities. They would seldom 
benefit from any ‘carrots’ on offer, and they would get many 
‘sticks’—for example, paying cigarette tax and ‘fat tax’, being 
rejected from certain jobs, and so forth (11,13,14). 
Obesity and overweight are not always associated with low 
education or low economic status. Different studies from 
Iran have reached different conclusions on this (12). More 
fundamentally, insofar as personal responsibility policies work, 
they increase patients’ health a lot, and so they tend to be good 
for them on balance. Even as they ‘penalize’ them, they help 
them to get rid of disease burdens that could often blight their 
lives far more substantially than any penalties like cigarette 
tax, ‘fat tax’, and so forth. Such policies are especially good 
not especially bad for minorities who suffer from an excessive 
disease burden—even if in the short term what they amount to 
for minority patients are few carrots and many sticks (15).
Sir Michael Marmot has recently warned, ‘evidence shows 
that actions aimed at encouraging individuals to make healthy 
choices will not be effective in reducing health inequalities—
such actions may make inequalities worse.’ His reason is that 
‘those with more education, for example, take heed of health 
messages to a greater extent than do those of lesser education’ 
(16). But when unhealthy choices are more common among the 
poorer or less educated, as Marmot’s work shows them to be, 
then the collective positive impact on the poor and less educated 
could remain greater than the one on the rich and educated. In 
any event, any health improvement, equal or unequal, should 
usually be welcomed.
The real problem with rejecting obese patients
Assume for the sake of argument that providing attractive 
incentives for weight losers and repulsive disincentives for 
weight gainers—conditional ‘carrots and sticks’—would drive 
some obese people to eat less and exercise more. Assume that 
the health risk and the social shame associated with obesity are 
insufficient to deter the obese from overeating, but that they 
would respond to some other (dis)incentives. Even so, it would 
remain wrong to turn the doctor into a ‘carrot’.
There are several reasons for that. Society would benefit 
tremendously from nurturing the notion that healthcare is 
a basic and an inalienable right, and from a culture in which 
doctors do not discriminate between patients but take them 
largely on the basis of medical need. We also face a substantial 
problem of stigma against obese patients. Rejection by doctors, 
with its penal undertones and implicit threat of remaining 
with no social support, might exacerbate that. Importantly, 
by inducing shame, augmented stigma may drive bringing on 
comfort feed and undermine, instead of facilitating, healthier 
eating. 
But I would like to feature another reason why rejecting obese 
patients is the wrong policy response to the epidemic. According 
to a rule of thumb that I shall propose, any conditional incentive 
for healthy choice should be in a currency other than the basic 
means to that healthy choice—in this case, the preventative and 
treatment services that facilitate weight loss. Doctors, health 
managers, and health policy makers can help us lose weight and 
remain thin by using carrots and sticks. They may want to offer 
prizes such as iPods or museum tickets or maybe even cash to 
patients who lose weight—not doctors, otherwise unavailable 
healthy food, or access to basic sports facilities.
Too often the carrots that health officials offer as incentives for 
healthy choices are the very means that people need in order 
to make such choices. Take an example I discussed a few years 
ago. At the time, the American state of West Virginia’s Medicaid 
(a coverage program for poor and/or disabled Americans) 
experimented with conditional prizes for ‘adherent’ patients 
only—for example, patients who kept medical appointments 
and took their medications. But among these exclusive prizes 
were mental healthcare and chemical-dependency services. So 
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thanks to the experiment, Virginians who needed psychiatric 
care or detox to restore order in their lives, potentially including 
the ability to keep appointments and take medications, had to 
have such order in their lives. Otherwise, psychiatrists and detox 
could remain out of reach (17).
Some policies that use the needed stepping stone to the solution 
as a carrot, which to be whisked away upon failure, are ongoing 
so-called pain contracts or opioid treatment agreements spell 
out rules that patients must follow to take opioid drugs safely. 
The contracts aim primarily to discourage patients from taking 
too much medication, mixing medications, and sharing or 
selling medications—all causes of a serious public health burden 
in the United States. These agreements may require patients to 
submit blood or urine drug tests, fill their prescriptions at a 
single pharmacy, or refuse to accept pain medication from any 
doctor other than the one against whom the particular contract 
is signed. Importantly, if patients fail to abide by the rules, the 
agreements often state that the doctor may drop them from their 
practice (18).
There is a lot to welcome in pain contracts and a lot to 
object to. What I would like to feature is the absurdity of one 
central element: using blocked access to care as the ‘stick’ for 
patients who fail and whose need of mental health or chemical-
dependency care has thus typically become apparent.
It is conceivable to me that sometimes, the incentive or the 
disincentive effect of gaining or losing a basic health benefit such 
as access to one’s doctor are so strong that they might overwhelm 
any bad effect on health from being denied care. But I suspect 
that it is rarely the case. We already know that nonadherent 
patients either have serious difficulties adhering (they genuinely 
lack access to transportation, to free time, and to other means of 
medical adherence) or less interest in improving their medical 
adherence in that area of health (and hence in avoiding sticks 
given in that same currency). So the feat of rejection from care is 
typically going to fail to goad them to become adherent. 
Why are doctors and health systems using rejection from care 
as the one ‘stick’ that, they promise, would motivate weight 
loss, smoking cessation, or opioid adherence? For some, the 
motive may be just getting rid of ‘difficult patients,’ whom they 
set up to fail. Perhaps West Virginia’s Medicaid reformers, 
some of whom were affiliated with fiscal conservative politician 
Newt Gingrich, sought simply to save money by slashing state 
benefits to poor or disabled patients. For doctors who care more 
genuinely for patients, perhaps like the primary care physician 
I mentioned earlier, the reason is probably that this is the only 
leverage they can pull. Their ‘toolkit’ does not contain alternate 
carrots and sticks. A possible lesson for health managers and 
policy planners is that we need to think more creatively about 
personal responsibility for health policies. If doctors, managers, 
and health policy makers had alternate carrots and sticks 
readily available, other than denial of necessary prevention 
and treatment, that would usually avoid the absurd situations I 
pointed out, where medical attention serves as a carrot or a stick 
for patients who need that attention unconditionally and who 
will often fail adherence testing.
Conclusion 
I have argued that conditioning (continuous) access to a doctor 
on low BMI is an absurd response to the obesity epidemic for 
multiple reasons. One to which I drew special attention is the 
absurdity of conditioning the very aid that patients need in 
order to become healthier on success in becoming healthier. 
Ethical and policy questions about personal responsibility for 
health are complex (19). But personal responsibility policies that 
involve such conditioning are clearly not the solution.
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